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F U N D A M E N T A L S  O F  E G O - L I N G U I S T I C S
Introduction
Since many readers may be somewhat puzzled by the peculiar label “ego-linguistics”,
some explanation as to the choice of my topic will be needed: is this a new, little-known
linguistic discipline, who represents it, and what are its principal goals? Is it supposed to
be just another method of detecting egoistic character traits? Or does it aim to describe
the linguistic behaviour of egomaniacs? It actually has nothing to do with any of the
above. My objective is a purely linguistic one. The idea of dealing with ego linguistics
was born when I was invited to deliver a speech at a graduate seminar at the University
of Basel devoted to the analysis of so-called “ego documents”, such as memoirs, diaries,
personal letters, etc. This topic turned out to be quite fashionable among historians;
what they felt was missing, however, was a general characterisation of such genres from
a linguistic point of view. Actually, I had to disappoint my colleagues’ expectations
since I chose the opposite direction: instead of providing a global description of ego-
oriented texts, I decided on a bottom-up approach, first by enumerating the multifarious
egocentric aspects of natural language in general and then by concentrating on a
microanalysis of ego-oriented reference. Since then, I have become more and more
fascinated by this topic, and I soon realised that the omnipresence of ego-orientation in
natural language deserves a fresh look. After all, nobody will deny the egocentric
character of language, but it still lacks a systematic elaboration in more than one
respect.
To start with, let us briefly recall the different egocentric elements in the notional
apparatus of our science. As is well known, innumerable linguistic notions include the
component ‘actual speaker’ in their definition. According to Bühler’s and Jakobson’s
classical approach, the speaker-oriented function of expression is listed among the three
basic sign functions, the whole concept of personal, local, and temporal deixis is based
on the speaker as its origin; in speech act theory, speaker-oriented components
constitute felicity conditions of all illocutions, performative verbs are by definition used
in the first person, epistemic and evidential / quotative modality characterise the
speaker’s knowledge, and in a given sentence it is the speaker who decides on the
distribution of presuppositional vs. propositional information. To this may be added
grammatical categories related to deixis, illocution, and modality, such as person, tense,
and mood; moreover, the speaker is responsible for the transformation of the
corresponding grammemes when using indirect or reported speech. And finally, lexical
units may contain axiological components expressing the speaker’s personal beliefs and
evaluations, not to mention the dichotomy of ‘own’ (svoi) vs. ‘other’ (ãuÏie), so dear to
Russian linguistics.
Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that many linguistic units reaching from
single expressions to complex constructions, from speech acts to whole text genres are
“ego-centred”. In a certain sense, all speakers are egomaniacs, willingly or not, guided
by linguistic categorisation. On the other hand, some items, e.g. the indefinite-personal
zero lexeme of the third person plural in Russian or certain verbs of perception such as
pokazat’sja, may exclude ego reference, whereas others combine it with reference to the
addressee and/or third persons, cf. my, the generic ty2, ãelovek or na‰ brat. In the same
vein, certain illocutions and text genres such as wishes, self-appraisals, self-critics,
oaths, confessions of guilt, etc., are ego-oriented, whereas others are more balanced in
that they relate the speaker’s position to that of the hearer, cf. apologies, expression of
thanks, threats, promises and the like; the same holds true for politeness strategies
which include honourifics, tact (generosity, modesty) maxims and other face-working
techniques.
In this paper, I would like to make a first attempt to classify at least part of this
enormous bulk of heterogeneous data according to the three basic domains of reference,
predication, and illocution. In order to illustrate their interplay, let me briefly display the
well known Searlean formula:
Sentence  ⇒ illocution + proposition
Proposition ⇒ predication + reference
At the beginning, special attention will be given to reference, where a first division
between direct, indirect, inclusive and inferred ego reference needs to be established.
Since the latter two types are subject to gradation, we are dealing with two continua,
one of which extends from the 1st person pronoun to simple omission, whereas the other
operates rather on some Gricean scale of inferential plausibility. Another criterion
singles out referential means which relate self to the addressee or third persons, either
by adopting (quoting or anticipating) the other’s point of view or by denoting self in
terms of other persons (cf. “your humble servant”).
Next, a quick look will be given at one grammatical category and two sentence types
which both seemingly exclude ego reference: imperatives, non-rhetorical yes/no quest-
ions and exclamations. Then ego reference will be combined with predication: which
classes of predicates are appropriate for the description of the speaker himself, and
which ones are less likely to occur with ego reference, but may on the contrary be more
suitable in descriptions of the addressee? Could there possibly be an absolute ban on
certain types of ego predication? Will we be able to find any language-specific
preferences for certain types of ego predications, or are we just reconstructing universal
asymmetries which would determine the relation between self and other? In order to
structure this discussion, I will be adopting Apresjan’s overview of the semantics of the
principal human systems which comprise perception, physical needs and sensations,
emotions, mental states and activities, etc.
As we shall see, the acceptability of ego predications is closely related to epistemic
modality: the less convincing a given predication looks, the more the need of adding
some modal marker increases in order to make the given utterance acceptable. This
holds true for predications about the addressee, but in specific cases also about the
speaker himself. Moreover, even less preferred modally unmarked predications may be
acceptable if they function in appropriate speech acts, e.g. blames, rhetorical questions
and the like. All these observations will hopefully lead to a more systematic and
profound account of the asymmetrical behaviour which manifests itself in predications
about the speaker’s and the addressee’s bodily sensations, feelings, thoughts, desires,
etc. Finally, I would like to shed some light on the enigma of ego predications with
quotative (hearsay) modality: in what contexts are we inclined to characterise ourselves
in terms of others’ statements?
It should be emphasised that in the existing literature on some aspects mentioned so
far, such as predicate classes or epistemic modality, observations concerning restrictions
of ego-oriented statements are not totally absent, but information is scarce and scattered,
and it needs to be expanded and generalised. To sum up, I do not claim that ego
linguistics should constitute a separate linguistic discipline, but I do claim that it
deserves a more careful, coherent and systematic approach, which may eventually
provide some interesting general conclusions.
Techniques of self-reference
Besides such simple techniques as dialogue with oneself or quotation of another
person’s utterance about the speaker, one should carefully keep apart the different
techniques of non-direct reference. Tentatively, one might distinguish the indirect,
inclusive and inferential mode of reference, all of which may be applied to ego-
reference. For the sake of simplicity, only individual personal ego-reference will be
considered, whereas collective and especially institutional ‘speakers’ will be left aside.
A first approach to the domain of ego-reference (Weiss 2008) was devoted to the
ego-referential potential of Russian personal pronouns including the vy of politeness,
the generalising ty 2 (“obob‰ãenno-liãnaja forma”) and the so-called indefinite personal
form of the 3d pers.pl. It was shown that all these lexemes may establish self-reference,
either directly or as an indirect, inferential or inclusive device. I n c l u s i v e
r e f e r e n c e  is represented by my (on this subject see Норман 2002) and ty 2, but also
by the 3d pers.plur. in generic or contrastive sentences and in pragmatic idioms of the
type Tebé govorjat or Vas bespokojat iz MVD, etc. and the generic use of the quasi-
pronoun _elovek (see Weiss 1996). The least appropriate form is vy 1, which only refers
inclusively to the speaker in quotations of others’ utterances. Due to the preference for
zeroes and ellipses in colloquial Russian, there exist quite a few cases that remain
ambiguous for ego- and other-referential use. Further studies will examine the
i n d i r e c t  ego-referential use of full NPs, such as ministr finansov (talking about
himself in an interview), surovyj uznik (self-designation by the writer Jurij Daniel’ as a
prisoner), or more standardised expressions functioning in scientific discourse (avtor) or
in legal documents (istec, otvetãik etc.). These self-designations may contain indexical
expressions referring to the speaker himself (moja osoba / persona, moja golovu‰ka) or
the addressee, such as Va‰ pokornej‰ij sluga, Tvoj lysen’kij suprug (= A. âexov), the
speaker’s name (tovari‰ã Stalin, Doktor âexov), etc. Further possible subclassifications
of indirect self-reference are based on semantic criteria such as proper vs. common
noun, designation of the referent's role in the on-going communication or his permanent
function / profession, metonymical reference by means of a body part designation (cf.
moja golovu_ka) or replacement by the possessive adjective moja as in two Russian-
based pidgins, i.e. Russenorsk and the Kjaxta Pidgin. Moreover, social and aesthetic
functions should also be taken into account: they arise when the speaker uses pseudo-
nyms, nick names in chats and humorous self-designations, to mention but a few.
The most indirect allusion to one’s own person is realised in contexts with i n f e r -
e n t i a l  ego-refence. This type may be illustrated by an excerpt of M. Gorbaãev’s
speech during the 1996 electoral campaign:
(1) За последнее десятилетие на политической арене России появилось немало талантливых
молодых политиков, способных участвовать в создании в России правового демократи-
ческого государства, основной задачей которого станет достижение благоденствия каждого
члена общества. Эти политики уже накопили достаточный опыт, ясно увидели трудности,
стоящие перед страной, получили определенную известность у россиян и их доверие. Опыт
управления такой сложной страной, как Россия, у них маловат. Но в команде умелого, много
испытавшего, сумевшего сломать тоталитарный коммунистический режим и дать людям
реальные свободы президента они приобретут его и, надеюсь, принесут немало пользы
своему Отечеству. (Gorbaãev 4. 6. 1996 NNS).
And finally, the speaker may simply o m i t  r e f e r e n c e  to himself as in the passive
voice (byli sover‰eny o‰ibki) or in nominalisations. All these indirect procedures have
multifarious motivations, among which one might mention the adoption of the
addressee’s or a third person’s point of view, quest for empathy, politeness strategies,
aesthetic and humorous strategies, defining oneself by one’s role in society or in
relation to the addressee, etc.
Ego predication: grammatical restrictions
Among ‘ego-sensitive’ grammatical categories, mood occupies a prominent place. The
key position is the i m p e r a t i v e , since by definition it should exclude the speaker as
subject in its “canonical” meaning, i.e. as a marker of a directive speech act. On the
other hand it is well known that Russian imperatives may occur in various derived and
often quite remote uses (cf. Fortuin 2000), such as the optative, conditional, concessive
and even narrative ones, which combine freely with the 1st pers., cf. Vernis’ ja ran’‰e!,
Pridi ja vovremja, …, Bud’ ja prokljat, Xot’ umri ja,… or Ja i skaÏi emu odin raz:… In
one of these derived uses, called ‘necessitive’ by Fortuin (2000:114ff.), we still can
reconstruct the missing link to the directive meaning: the utterance Oni gonjajut lodyrja,
a ja rabotaj! may be traced back to a quasi-quotation of the type A ty rabotaj!1 What is
more, Russian offers two particles (-ka and daj) that may mark even directives
addressed to the speaker himself, cf. Zajdu-ka k sosedu vzgljanut’, kak ustroilsja, Daj
sletaju v Moskvu, or (with both particles combined) Daj-ka proãtu e‰ãe raz.
Another domain of doing ego-linguistics is constituted by sentence types. Y e s / n o -
q u e s t i o n s  seem to block 1st person subjects, cf. *Ja ustal?, *Ja ne ustal? However, if
we transform them into the type called ‘neuverennyj refleksivnyj vopros’ by Рестан
(1969), the 1st pers. is no longer an obstacle, cf. (Ne) Ustal li ja? The same holds for
deliberative questions of the type âto Ïe skaÏu emu? SkaÏu, ãto ljublju drugogo?
Obviously, this is due to the implicit modal semantics of this subtype, cf. the more
explicit paraphrase ‘What shall I tell him?’ And finally, the 1st pers.sg. sounds fine in
counter-questions within dialogues such as the following: My pojdem v kino. — A ja
(pojdu s vami)? In this way, ego reference is excluded in one subtype of yes/no-
questions, but freely admitted in other subtypes. As will be shown in the next section,
yes/no-questions should be considered in a broader context since they fill in a gap
where the corresponding assertions sound odd; to illustrate this, we have to enlarge our
object by including ‘you predications’.
E x c l a m a t i o n s  would require a more profound examination than what can be
offered in the present study. A few remarks may do to illustrate the fundamental
asymmetry between ego and other within this domain:
(2a) Какой ты / он ужасный бабник!
(2b) ?Какой я ужасный бабник!
(3а) С каким увлечением ты коллекционируешь / он коллекционирует марки!
(3b) ??С каким увлечением я коллекционирую марки!
The variants (2b) and (3b) would only be acceptable in an ironical or joking context.
Note that the negative evaluation is by no means an obstacle to ego in itself, since we
have not only Kakoj ja molodec! but also, for instance,
(4) Какой я (однако) тупица / дурак / болван!
On the other hand, not every positive evaluation can be asserted about oneself, cf.
(5a) Как ловко ты  танцуешь / ловко oна танцует!
                                                 
1 The hybrid variant … a mne rabotaj owes its dative probably to the synonymous modal infinitive
construction, cf.: a mne rabotat’.
(5b) ?Как ловко я танцую!
In general, the question of what kinds of actions, behaviour, properties etc. can cause
one’s own surprise, astonishment or admiration is far from being evident. First of all,
one should probably separate expressions of mere astonishment from other emotional
ego-oriented speech acts, such as boasting, self-appraisal or self-criticism (as in 4): the
component of unexpectedness, which is crucial in the surprise type, is not implied by
the latter illocutions. For the time being, we will have to restrict ourselves to the
statement that time reference plays a crucial role: exclamations in the 1st pers. are odd
when referring to an ongoing process (i.e. with the progressive meaning of the
imperfective aspect). This conclusion is already suggested by ex. (5b) and corroborated
by examples as the following:
(6a) Как ты потеешь / он потеет!
(6b) ? Как я потею!
Note that both (5b) and (6b) sound much better if we insert (po)smotri, since by means
of this the speaker adopts the adresses’s perspective, so that the process in question may
really be unexpected.
The main asymmetries of self vs. you
We may now tackle our main subject, i.e. the field of ego predication. As is well known,
the first author to have tackled this subject was Benveniste (1971). In order to structure
this enormous field, it seems however advisable to adopt the overview of ‘basic human
systems’, established in Апресян (1995:355-366). Among the domains enumerated
there, the following ones merit to be singled out as especially ‘ego-sensitive’:
• perception
• physical needs and sensations
• emotion
• desire, will
• mental activity
• speech
In what follows, we will only discuss the first three categories from this inventory. First
of all, we must distinguish assertions from yes/no-questions; as will be shown, this
dichotomy is fundamental for the discussion of the asymmetrical behaviour of
utterances in the 1st pers.sg. and 2nd pers.sg. For the sake of simplicity, we will further
limit the discussion to utterances in the present tense; as for mood, both indicative and
conjunctive will be taken into account. The following observations are divided into
three sections: first, modally unmarked sentences will be examined, then sentences
containing markers of epistemic and quotative modality.
To begin with, s e n s u a l  p e r c e p t i o n  is not likely to be subject to any restrictions
at the first glance, since what we see, hear, smell etc., is usually also accessible to the
addressee’s senses; hence, we would not expect there to be any asymmetrical behaviour
of linguistic expressions. However, two cases should be mentioned where ego reference
is almost excluded. The first is presented in Апресян (1995:640), where two classes of
expressions with built-in deixis are discussed, viz. verbs such as vidnet’sja, belet’ or
pokazat’sja and the spatial adverbs vdaleke, vdali, vblizi. To illustrate their ‘deviant’
behaviour, I just quote the author’s own examples (the preterit can of course be changed
into the present forms pokazyvajus’ and stoim):
(7) На дороге показался ты / он /*я
(8) *Вдалеке стояли мы с Володей
Both types of expressions contain an built-in observer point which coincides with the
place of the speaker. Since the latter cannot see himself standing somewhere in a remote
distance, example (7) blocks ego reference, and the same holds for (8). There is,
however, a way how to save the 1st pers. subject: if we describe the whole scene as
imaginary or perceived by somebody else, ego reference becomes possible. This type of
‘imagine’-contexts will turn out to be useful in other situations with dispreferred ego
reference as well. As is shown in Падучева (2007), the verb vygljadet’ behaves in a
similar, though not identical way, since it opens a slot for an external observator.
Moreover, it occurs freely in direct and indirect questions and with epistemic markers,
i.e. in contexts which generally help to make otherwise impossible statements
acceptable (see below).
The second case where the speaker cannot act as the visual perceiver has to do with
the construction of our body: we may be able to hear ourselves, smell ourselves, even
taste ourselves, but we will not see our back nor our face without the aid of a technical
device, say a mirror. This is why the following sentences require a specific context:
(9) *Я на глазах пьянею.   (but cf.: Ты на глазах пьянеешь)
(10) ?Мои глаза горят любовью.  (but: Твои глаза горят любовью)
Again, both sentences become acceptable in a fictitious situation where the speaker
observes himself from outside; moreover, example 10 fits well into a frame such as
‘Look at me’, e.g. in a confession of love. They would equally be acceptable as yes/no-
questions of the type Moi glaza ne gorjat ljubov’ju? And finally, epistemic marking
would make the assertions possible, cf. Moi glaza naverno gorjat ljubov’ju.
The situation changes when we turn to the expression of p h y s i c a l  n e e d s ,
b o d i l y  s e n s a t i o n s ,  e m o t i o n s ,  d e s i r e s  and thoughts. The overall picture
that obtains in all these domains remains constant: the speaker knows better than
anybody else what he feels, wants, thinks, etc., whereas the addressee’s feelings,
thoughts etc. are a sort of black box to him. Due to this fundamental asymmetry, we
may predict that in all these domains ego assertions are preferred and you assertions
dispreferred. On the other hand, we may still ask about what we do not know, and here
the picture is reversed: you-questions will be preferable to I-questions since the
addressee knows better than the speaker what he feels, experiences etc. (this is of course
reminiscent of our discussion above on the pair Ja ustal? vs. Ty ustal?). The following
table represents this distribution:
Figure 1: predications about inner states
Ego vs. addressee 1st pers 2nd pers
assertion preferred dispreferred
Yes/no-question dispreferred preferred
Note that this contrasts sharply with the distribution of perceptive statements discussed
above, examples (9) and (10):
Figure 2: predications about visual perception not accessible to the speaker
Ego vs. addressee 1st pers 2nd pers
assertion dispreferred preferred
Yes/no-question preferred dispreferred
According to figure 1, we may predict the following preference hierarchies:
(11a) Я голоден. > Ты голоден. (11b) Ты голоден? > Я голоден?
(11c) Меня тошнит. > Тебя тошнит. (11d) Тебя тошнит? > Меня тошнит?
Yet it seems beyond any doubt that the dispreferred variants do occur in appropriate
contexts. For instance, in the following case, the speaker may well describe his own
sensations by using the generalising ‘you’, cf.
(12) Я чувствую острую боль > Ты чувствуешь острую боль.
As may be recalled from what was said in the beginning, such sentences are ego-
inclusive, even if they appeal also to the addressee (‘you know the same type of
situation and therefore can feel what I felt’). In order to avoid this ego-component, we
will exclude sentences with ty 2 in what follows. It should however be pointed out that
limited contexts like the ones to be found in the Russian National Corpus often do not
allow an unequivocal decision which meaning of the 2nd person is realised in the given
case; this aggravates the search of data considerably.
There are, however, other contexts where no ego-component is lurking behind the
use of the 2 nd pers. One is represented by the following fictitious example:
(13) Вы голодны. Холодильник пуст. Но рядом – Snickers....
This sequence could be part of an advertisement. It would realise what Медведева
(2003) calls the hypnotic effect of advertising. The original version looks somewhat
more sober:
(14) Hungry? Grab a Snickers www.mikescandywrappers.com
Instead of the dispreferred you-statement, we find a simple question (“Hungry?”),
which according to our basic hypothesis represents the preferred version. The same
procedure is of course possible in Russian (“Goloden?”). Note that instead of the yes/
no-question we could have a conditional clause as well, cf. “If you are hungry,… / “Esli
ty goloden, …”). This substitution reflects the semantic affinity of conditional clauses
and yes/no-questions: both offer a choice between two possible worlds which might
equally be true.2 Both variants alternate in our next example:
(15) Мужчина: Если ты голоден, мы можем поесть, мама сказала, что в холодильнике есть
йогурт… Ты голоден? Нет? Ты не особо, не особо нацелен на контакт со мной… Мне про-
должать читать?.. Послушай, мне тяжело угадывать твои желания, Макс… твоя мама будет
недовольна, если мы… если ты ляжешь спать голодным… (www.esquire.ru/articles/13/play/)
                                                 
2 Note that there is a another esli, whose meaning roughly coincides with raz in that the truth of the
whole clause is presupposed; cf. Иорданская, Мельчук (2007:495).
But both variants belong to the preferred, non-assertive type of context since both
conditional and yes/no-question express an offer. A temporal clause with kogda behaves
in a similar way if it denotes a repeated action, cf.
(16) Голод не тетка, когда ты голоден, все кажется вкусным
What is stated here is not the addressee’s hungriness, but an implicational link of the
type ‘whenever p, q is true’.
The same holds true for contexts where ty goloden is not stated by the speaker
himself, but attributed to somebody else:
(17) Бог заметил, что ты голоден и придумал МакДональс, Баскин Робинс. Он заметил, что тебя
мучает жажда и придумал PEPSI, сок, кофе и воду. Бог увидел, что тебе темно и придумал
свет; a Бог заметил, что у тебя нет Очаровательного, обожаемого, ДРУГА......... и он приду-
мал М Е Н Я (planeta.rambler.ru/users/zhuravlljova/10299145.html)
Contrary to all this, the you-assertion in (13) posits the truth of one alternative and is
therefore more suggestive than a conditional clause or a yes/no-question. However,
since Russian advertising most often uses the politeness form, i.e. the 2nd pers.pl., it
would be hard to find attested examples such as (13) (note that 17 is not an advertis-
ement!) apart from real cases of hypnosis. What we do find, however, are examples
such as the following:
(18) Ради моей жизни, ешь, не стыдись! Эй, мальчик, - крикнул он затем, - подай нам мясо в
уксусе и жирных куропаток!” И сказал моему брату: “Ешь, гость, ты голоден и нуждаешься
в этом”. (www.skazka.com.ru/vzrosl/1001/0000049-1001.html)
Again, one might wonder what enables the speaker to utter such a statement. The
previous context unveils this secret: the hungry guest had already uttered an ego-
statement:
(18’)...и брат сообщил ему, что он нуждается. И, услышав слова моего брата, этот человек проявил
сильное огорчение и, взявшись рукою за свою одежду, разорвал ее и воскликнул: “Я живу в
этом городе, а ты в нем голодаешь! Мне не вынести этого!” И он обещал ему всякие блага и
сказал: “Ты непременно должен разделить со мной соль”. И мой брат ответил: “О господин,
у меня нет терпения, и я сильно голоден!”
Thus the speaker in (18) simply repeats what he has been told by the addressee. Still
another case is represented by cases like the following:
(19) — Ты лесная птица или вырвался из клетки?
Я равнодушно ответил:
— И то и другое.
— Понимаю. Значит, ты голоден.
Был ли я голоден! Они говорили спокойно о голоде и не подозревали, что мне свело кишки.
This time, what is uttered is a conclusion (cf. znaãit). Thus, once more we are not
dealing with a direct observation since the addressee’s bodily sensations are a kind of
black box to us.
This said, we still have to reckon with possible contexts where the bodily condition
of the addressee is at least partly accessible to the speaker’s perception. For instance, if
Яковлева (1994:225) posits the following asymmetry:
(20) У меня  / *у тебя внутри все пересохло. ,  
one might imagine a context where the speaker is examining the addressee’s dried out
throat.  On the other hand, there exist idioms that do not allow for any deviation from
ego reference, including yes/no-questions, cf.
(21a) Я себя что-то плохо чувствую сегодня.
(21b) *Ты себя что-то плохо чувствуешь сегодня.
(21c) *Ты себя что-то плохо чувствуешь сегодня?
Obviously, the obstacle lies in the indefinite particle что-то that marks the speaker’s
own vague evaluation.
Our next topic is e m o t i o n a l  predicates. Again, according to the Russian proverb
ãuÏaja du‰a  — vsegda potemki we expect ego-assertions and you-questions to be
preferred, whereas ego-questions and you-assertions would require special contexts.
This holds equally for positive and negative feelings independently from their degree of
intensity. Moreover, the surface realisation (verb, adjective, predicative) should not
have any impact on the acceptability. Consequently, we may for instance predict the
following preference scales according to figure 1 presented above:
(22a) Мне страшно > Тебе страшно but: Тебе страшно? > Мне страшно?
(22b) Я раздражен  > Ты раздражен Ты раздражен? > Я раздражен?
(22c) Я радуюсь  > Ты радуешься Ты радуешься? > Я радуюсь?
(22d) Мне грустно > Тебе грустно Тебе грустно? > Мне грустно?
A first glance into the Russian National Corpus (September 2006) confirmed our
expectation. The following figures obtained for a search of the 1st pers. sing. and the 2nd
pers. pl. of the verb radovat’sja (recall that for the purpose of avoiding ambiguous
examples with interfering generic reading, we excluded the 2 nd pers. sg.):
Радуюсь:  396 
Радуетесь:      21
радуетесь?       20
Again, one wonders what might be appropriate contexts for the dispreferred you-
assertions. The following examples provide a convincing explanation: as the
expressions put into italics indicate, they all contain the speaker’s evaluation that the
addressee’s feelings are not justified:
(23) Рано радуетесь!
(24) Напрасно радуетесь, москвичи! 
(25) А вы человека убили и радуетесь!
In other words, what is really asserted (i.e. focalised or part of the rhematic part of the
sentence) is the evaluation, whereas the statement raduetes’ belongs to the pre-
supposition. 16 out of the 20 dispreferred examples represented cases of such a
disapproval. More often than not, what results is a reproach of the type illustrated in 25.
Three examples contain a generalised temporal clause, cf.
(26) Грех, - он говорил им во время своего вынужденного кругосветного путешествия, - это
когда вы не радуетесь жизни. [Марина Москвина. Небесные тихоходы: путешествие в
Индию (2003)]
Once more then, raduetes’ does not express the speaker’s assessment of a current state
of affairs; the imperfective aspect is not used in the progressive, but the iterative
meaning. In the two remaining examples the verb is either part of a conditional clause or
embedded in a quotation of somebody else’s utterance.
The picture obtained for the distribution of ja rada vs. ty rada3 in the Russian
National Corpus (September 2006) looks even more impressive:
Я рада: Найдено документов:    501, контекстов: около 1 тысячи
Ты рада. Найдено контекстов:     43
Most contexts of the dispreferred you-assertions are reminiscent of example (25) in that
they express a blame:
(27) Ты рада бы, чтобы я совсем не... не просыпался! 
(28) — Ты как будто не рада, что я жив, — вдруг с обидой произнес Ваня. — Знаешь, наверное,
ты хотела, чтобы я умер, да?
(29) Ерофеев мне по поводу предстоящего моего визита к зубному врачу: "Ты  ведь так рада,
что не придешь в пятницу и отдохнешь от меня". [Наталья Шмелькова. Последние дни
Венедикта Ерофеева (2002)]
Moreover, the you-assertion in (27) is in the conditional and followed by a
counterfactual clause, and in (28) it is epistemically marked by kak budto.
The following example does not even show a shadow of a reproach: on the contrary,
it denotes an event of utmost positive significance for the addressee (pregnancy).
However, it does not contradict our main prediction since ty rada expresses an imagined
state, introduced by the speaker’s ‘empathetic’ statement Ja predstavljaju:
(30) Я представляю, как ты рада, наконец –то!
[Беременность: Планирование беременности // Форум на eva.ru, 2005]
On the basis of the examples examined so far, we may conclude that our prediction
works fairly well: dispreferred assertions about the addressee’s sensations and feelings
do occur, but they never function as real statements about a current state of affair.
Instead of this, first they can be marked modally by lexical means such as adverbs,
particles, superordinated verbs or by the conditional mood and realise suppositions, acts
of imagination or conclusions. Besides this, they may be embedded in a quotative
hypersentence, cf. example (17). Even when modally unmarked, they may accomplish a
quotative function by pointing back to an ego-assertion as in example (18). Second,
their lexical filling may indicate specific illocutions such as blame or surprise. Third,
they may denote non-actual (habitual, iterative) actions. To complicate things even
more, in all three cases the you-statement may function as a presupposition rather than
an autonomous predication. On the whole, our prediction that there are no true
assertions about the other’s sensations and emotions remains valid.
What should still be tested (but cannot be tested in the present study) is the other side
of the coin, i.e. the preference for you-questions over ego-questions as in Ty rada?  >
Ja rada? It is evident that here, too, appropriate contexts for the dispreferred variant can
be found, for instance echo questions of the type Ty naverno rada ego uxodu? – Ja,
rada? Due to the lack of space, this topic will, however, not be examined in the present
                                                 
3 The choice of the feminine gender helps to avoid the generic ego-inclusive meaning of ty 2, although
in principle the latter is also possible with female reference. As for the personal pronouns, we are aware
of the possibility of zero marking (ellipsis), but the account of such not very numerous cases would take
too much space within the modest frame of the present study.
study, but cf. the preliminary remarks on questions with a verb in the 1st pers. sing. in
the previous section..
The reversed picture: epistemic modality
Since implicit (unmarked) modality has already turned out to be a crucial factor for
our discussion, our next concern will be the study of epistemically marked utterances.
On the basis of our main hypothesis, their behaviour is fairly predictable: their distribut-
ion will be parallel to that of modally unmarked yes/no-questions, both types of utter-
ances being related to the speaker’s uncertainty about the real state of affairs. Hence, we
obtain a picture reverse to that presented by assertions in the previous section:
Figure 3: epistemically marked utterances
Ego vs. addressee 1st pers 2nd pers
assertion dispreferred preferred
On the other hand, the distribution of epistemically marked yes/no-questions will be
roughly the same as that of simple yes/no-questions, or else that of epistemically
marked assertions.
This allows us to predict the following preference pattern for expressions of bodily
sensations:
(31a) Ты, кажется  /  наверно /  быть может / видимо голоден  >>
(31b) Я, кажется  /  наверно /  быть может / видимо голоден.
(32a) У тебя, кажется,  / наверно /  быть может / видимо внутри все пересохло.  >>
(32b) У меня, кажется,  / наверно /  быть может / видимо внутри все пересохло.
In a similar vein, expressions of emotions should exhibit the following pattern:
(33a) Tы, кажется  / может  /  видимо /  вероятно  /  несомненно   / бесспорно / по-моему раздражен
>>
(33b) Я, кажется  / может  /  видимо /  вероятно /  несомненно   / бесспорно / *по-моему раздражен
(34a) Tы, кажется  / может  /  видимо /  вероятно  /  несомненно   / бесспорно / по-моему не рад нас
видеть >>
(34b) Я, кажется  / может  /  видимо /  вероятно /  несомненно  / бесспорно / *по-моему не рад вас
видеть.
At this point, we are forced to take into account the diverging degrees of acceptability,
characteristic of the epistemic expressions used in these contexts. What is most striking
is the ban for po-moemu with ego-predications, but there are different acceptability rates
all throughout the quoted variants; for instance, in 33b nesomnenno sounds odder than
kaÏetsja, etc. The reason for this seems obvious: epistemic modality is very
heterogenous in that it marks not only different degrees of certainty, but above all
different sources of knowledge. For instance, po-vidimomu says nothing about the
probability of the event in question but expresses a conclusion based on empirical
(visual, auditive etc.) or cognitive evidence, thus excluding the speaker’s direct
experience. A different approach is proposed by Булыкина, Шмелев (1997:293-304),
who distinguish the following types: merely hypothetical modality (dolÏno byt’,
naverno(e), nesomnenno, verojatno, vozmoÏno, moÏet (byt’), so called “impressives”
(vrode, k a Ïetsja, kak budto) and finally the “operators of uncertain evaluation”
(‘operatory neuverennoj ocenki’) of the type mne kaÏetsja, po-moemu.4 Let us briefly
illustrate the difference between hypothetical and impressive modality by the authors’
own example: When the phone is ringing, the speaker may utter a hypothesis like
Naverno, òto zvonit redaktor before picking it up, but if he is already listening to the
caller’s voice and wondering who he could be he can only say KaÏetsja, òto zvonit
redaktor (ibd:299). In other words, impressive statements are triggered by some
physical perception that cannot be interpreted unequivocally (cf. also KaÏetsja, paxnet
gazom). Another appropriate context is provided by vague remembrance, cf. Kak Ïe ee
zvali, ne pomnju… kaÏetsja (*naverno), Nata‰a . It goes without saying that this
distinction has a huge impact on the asymmetry under discussion in that impressives are
more likely to occur with ego reference, whereas hypothetical modality is typical of
you-statements. And finally, the operators of uncertain evaluation mark the speaker’s
subjective opinion about something he has perceived or experienced himself: in Mne
kaÏetsja, fil’m xoro‰ij or Fil’m, po-moemu, xoro‰ij the speaker emphasises that he does
not pretend his judgment to be generally valid. This helps to explain why po-moemu
sounds particularly odd in predications about one’s own feelings, cf. sentences (33b)
and (34b) above.
What has been said so far on the subtypes of epistemic modality is but a first approx-
imation; for more details, see Булыгина, Шмелев (1997:300 –304). Let us now
illustrate the hypothetical type using statements about the other’s  feelings:
(35) мда куда мир катиться!!! бывшая не бывшая а она человек а ты видимо рад что она
загремела в больничку!!! Бог накажет тебя!!!
www.jjurnal.ru/Lovekiller/Dezhavyu.html
(36) - Что-то я не пойму, ты, кажется, рад, что тебе уши оторвут? - Каждый раз, когда рестлер
сжимал ухо еще сильнее, Тацуо быстро перебирал ногами и издавал крик.
(users.gazinter.net/kbee/book/deti.htm)
(37) Борька со своей фразой заложил основу для распада России, чему ты несомненно рад.
(www.voinenet.ru/forum/showthread.php?t=763&page=14)
All examples cited meet our hypothesis that hypothetical modality fits well into you-
predications, notwithstanding the additional illocutionary marks in (35), which is a
blame much as (27-29) above, and (36), an astonished question. The next series shows,
however, that the same type of modality is compatible with ego-predications as well:
(38) Я может рад что она чемпионка, но гордиться только этим нельзя. Пусть себя нормально
ведёт.
(www.kavkazweb.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=36087&sid=16217f3c21aee9a958f50f22f3632f99)
(39) Как приверженец Фри, я несомненно рад, что любимая операционка сделала рывок, но если
в каком-то бенчмарке фри провалит тест, я не собираюсь разводить демагогию по поводу
того, что где-то что-то не так сделали за исключением вопиющих фактов, что и всем
советую. (www.opennet.ru/openforum/vsluhforumID3/36788.html)
(40) "Конференцией честно говоря не доволен. Слишком уж все благодушно. Я бесспорно рад
вместе со всеми за те позитивные перемены, которые произошли за последние годы при
участии министерства, общественных объединений. Но  согласитесь, два дня говорить о
                                                 
4 The authors add quotative (hearsay) modality to this list.  According the approach of van der
Auwera, Plungjan (1998) I adhere to, however, the latter (in other words: the govorjat-type) does not
belong to epistemic modality in the narrow sense and will be discussed separately in the next section
below.
достижениях – это излишне, поскольку может привести к благодушию.
www.minpred.ru/?page=content&artid=737
All three excerpts share one common property, though: the epistemically marked utter-
ance is followed by the adversative conjunction no. In this way, the modal adverbs
moÏet, nesomnenno and bessporno serve rather as discourse markers than real epistemic
expressions: they signal that the ego-statement is going to be somehow corrected
(restricted, attenuated) in the following sentence. As for moÏet, this comes as no
surprise, since this expression functions in the same way with you-predications. More
striking, however, is the behaviour of nesomnenno: a search done by the Google search
machine (3/10/2005) revealed an overwhelming majority of uses with ego-reference (ja
nesomnenno rad: 268 instances, ty nesomnenno rad: 5 instances). Since the majority of
cases were found in blogs and internet forums, the variant with 1st pers.sg. might be a
formulaic expression typical of these genres. However this may be, the behaviour of
epistemic markers with ego and you-predications constitutes a topic of its own and
deserves an in depth analysis, which by far exceeds the scope of the present study.
Quotative ego-predication
Finally, a few very sketchy remarks will be made about hearsay modality. Here, one is
tempted to formulate the same assumption as with epistemic modality: you-statements
will be preferred, ego-statements dispreferred, since the speaker seldom speaks about
himself in terms of somebody else’s statements. As the following examples show, the
picture is, however, much more tricky. The first example seems to confirm our
expectation:
(41a) ? Кажется, / ?говорят, я ?вроде / ?как будто собираюсь во Францию.
(41b) Кажется, / говорят, ты вроде / как будто собираешься во Францию.
Note, however, that even 41b rather calls for a tag question of the type Ty kak budto
sobirae‰’sja vo Franciju? (”isn’t it?”). With the 1st pers.sg., such a tag question would
be out of place, cf. *Ja kak budto sobirajus’ vo Franciju?
But the next pair already shows that the predicates involved may be more crucial since
here, both ego- and you-predications sound equally odd:
(42a) Говорят, я болен  / ? голоден / ? плачу / ?? приехал.  but also:
(42b) Говорят, ты  болен  / ? голоден / ? плачешь / ?? приехал.
And on the other hand, the following attested and wholly acceptable quotative ego-
statements were found by a Google search:
(43) Говорят, я ужасный бабник / я умный / я возрождаю Третий Рейх / я не умею общаться.
All these predicates combine equally well with 1st and  2nd pers. reference. The reason is
evident: they all denote p e r m a n e n t  p r o p e r t i e s  of the subject, whereas the
predicates in 42 refer to temporally limited states, bolen being the only one that may
extend over a longer time span. Moreover, priexal contains an built-in deictic reference
to the place of the ongoing speech event, which makes quotations of other persons even
more implausible. Consequently, time reference associated to the predicate in question
seems to overrule the preference for you- rather than ego reference. This is, however,
only part of the story. The following parameters were found to play an important role
for the distribution of quotative ego-statements:
preferred dispreferred
• Permanent characteristics (Generic states) • Location at speech time
• General evaluations • Current emotions
• Habitual appearance (outfit, etc.) • Current bodily sensations
• Past activities / location / outfit / emotions • Current physical activities
• Current mental states and 
   activities
Again, this topic needs a separate analysis and cannot be dwelled upon any further.
Conclusions
Our little overview was to serve a twofold purpose: it should demonstrate the main
asymmetries predications about ‘inner states’ of speaker and hearer are subject to in a
systematic way, and it was meant to provide some hints in what respect such an analysis
could be useful. As for the first aspect, the following distribution was found to be
crucial: the choice between a modally unmarked assertion and an epistemically marked
assertion or else a yes/no-question depends above all on the accessibility of the
information for the speaker. The first strategy works well when he is dealing with his
own sensations, feelings, thoughts, desires etc., whereas the other’s bodily, emotional
and mental states usually require the adoption of the second strategy. Information
obtained by direct sensual perception is fairly neutral to the aforementioned distinction
with certain exceptions, including seeing one’s own face or back or perception of
oneself at a place which is not identical with one’s place during the current speech
event. All these restrictions can be overruled by more sophisticated techniques of the
‘imagine’ type, i.e. by taking over the addressee’s point of view. Moreover, we have
detected a whole series of other criteria that seemingly allow the speaker to violate the
restrictions described above, among them habitual time reference, conditional
semantics, conclusions based on perceptual or cognitive evidence, and the resumption
of previously established information. Yet, none of these cases constitutes real
counterevidence, since none of them can be said to directly denote a state of affairs
present at the time of the given speech event.
As for the second aspect, i.e. the practical profit to be taken from such an analysis, it
turned out that the systematics outlined in this study can serve as a kind of heuristic tool
that allows to describe more precisely the restrictions on exclamatory sentences and
quotative modality or the idiosyncratic behaviour of many lexical items, to mention but
the indefinitive particle ãto-to (example 21), the subtle differences between the various
subtypes of epistemic modality or the discourse properties of particular epistemic
markers (recall the sequence nesomnenno…, no as in ex. 39). A thorough analysis of
epistemic and quotative ego predications will certainly add much more details relevant
for the description of particular lexical units expressing these meanings.
Finally, typologists will easily detect the link between our topic and the grammatical
category known as Conjunct/Disjunct systems to be found in a whole range of
languages in the Himalayan area and the Barbacoan group spoken in the lowlands of
Ecuador and Colombia (cf. Cysouw 2003). This peculiar person marking system is
closely linked with the opposition ‘witnessed event vs. evidentiality’ and consists
roughly of two forms, one for the first person and the other one for non-first (second
and third) person in declarative sentences and second vs. non-second person in
interrogative sentences. It would be tempting to compare the precise distribution of
these forms with our findings within the opposition of ego vs. other reference and
predication.
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